Volume 1, Number 1
Power in Peace and War. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1996.
many things to different people. Social scientists associate eight interpretations
to the expression. Statecraft, or more mundanely government, requires knowledge
both in a general and in a particular sense. Intelligence in government
usually has a more restricted meaning than just information and its collection,
processing and use. It is related to international affairs, defense, national
security and secrecy and it works through specialized institutions labeled
"intelligence." It constitutes its own particular kind of state power,
which is sometimes demonized in democratic countries because of the official
secrecy, clouding its information and hiding its actions. The media deal
mainly with the sensational aspects of spy stories or indulge in the failure
of intelligence. This book tries to analyze the intelligence system, the
interaction of people in the intelligence organizations and the underlying
processes, with special attention to the big, computer-based agencies,
which are an important part of twentieth-century government. It is a scholarly
study and for those readers who want to know about the internal workings
of intelligence it provides more fascination than many of the "cloak and
dagger" spy stories.
has been a professional intelligence practitioner whose career coincided
almost exactly with the Cold War. His viewpoint developed into one of an
Organization Man in the British intelligence system. Thereafter he wrote
and taught about intelligence, made some forays into social sciences studies
of organizations and their transmission and use of information and explored
its literature. He is now a lecturer at Nuffield College Oxford.
The study about
"Intelligence Power in Peace and War" falls into seven parts. Part I describes
how the modern system has evolved, provides an outline model of it and
describes the subjects with which it deals. Part II analyses the model
in more detail and examines its components, collection sources and their
characteristics, all-source analysis and its assessment, and their boundaries
with each other and other government activities. Part III outlines the
effects of intelligence on national and international action, security,
threats and co-operation. Part IV, titled "accuracy," deals with the problem
of intelligence judgement and suggests some principles for improving performance.
Part V searches for principles to increase efficiency in the production
process, in managing the intelligence community and focuses on the role
of the agency manager. Part VI attempts to estimate the national and international
importance of intelligence in the post-Cold War world. Conclusions about
intelligence as a whole are summarized as Part VII in the final chapter.
Ease of reading is assisted by a glossary of terms and abbreviations, 19
graphics and figures and an well-assembled index. The author’s "Suggestions
for further reading," together with the pertinent and explanatory footnotes
constitute an introductory guide to intelligence studies, which is nicely
structured and explains the important works and their significance.
The author very
clearly states the topics, which are not covered in his book. He is not
dealing with the controversial issues of intelligence’s democratic accountability,
legal status and implications for individuals’ rights. Herman draws from
his British experience and restricts himself to the Anglo-American-Commonwealth
intelligence model. However, this is not much of a restriction. The majority
of published literature stems from Anglo-Saxon sources and the intelligence
patterns of the "Western" countries, including Israel, resemble each other
The study of Michael
Herman is a very valuable addition to the analytical intelligence literature.
It provides a comprehensive overview how intelligence works and functions.
As a former intelligence professional, the author knows that not only intelligence
but also scholarly results need to be presented in a language, which appeals
to the novice, the practitioner and scholar alike and he is very good at
this. His thoroughly researched, well-structured and very readable book
is highly recommendable.
ed., At Cold War’s End: US-Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, 1989-1991. [Reston, VA]: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999.
As a contribution
to the „Conference on US-Intelligence and the End of the Cold War" on the
Texas A&M University Campus at College Station from 18 to 20 November
1999 the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) prepared a Compendium
of newly declassified US Intelligence Documents covering the years 1989-1991.
comprises 24 documents, 12 of them NIE´s and 4 SNIE´s. (National
and Special National Intelligence Estimates – NIE´s and SNIE´s
– are prepared for the President, his Cabinet, the National Security Council
and Senior policymakers and officials. Estimates are issued over the signature
of the Director of Central Intelligence and represent the coordinated view
of the Community´s member agencies.)
The documents are
divided into six chapters: The Soviet Crises – Gorbachev and the Perils
of Perestroike; The End of Empire I – Eastern Europe; The End of Empire
II – National Secession and Ethnic/Conflict in the USSR; New Thinking –
Soviet Foreign Relations; The Military Balance I – Conventional Forces
in Europe; The Military Balance II – Strategic Nuclelar Weapons.
The documents were
selected and edited by Benjamin B. Fischer of CIA´s History Staff
who also wrote the preface, commenting the documents. The preface is an
utmost helpful guide through the documents and at the same time a well
written and concise account of US. policy toward the the Soviet Union and
the collapse of communismen in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
familiar with the overall political and economic issues surrounding the
end of the soviet system will find the Estimates on military-strategic
subjects of special interest; indeed they are unique. NIE 11-3/8, "Soviet
Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict through the late
1990s" , according to Benjamin Fischer the bible on Soviet strategic nuclear
weapons for US military planers, reveals facts and interpretations that
were once among the Intelligence Community`s most highly classified secrets.
Still in late 1988
the Intelligence Community kept it`s skeptical and traditional conservativ
approach vis a vis the Soviet military capabilities, concluding in NIE
judge however, that Soviet force decicions including arms control agreements
will continue to be more strongly influenced by the requirements to meet
military and political objectives than by economic issues.
Only nine month later
in november 1989 NIE 4-1-84 "Warning of war in Europe. Changing Warsaw
Pact Planning and Forces" stated:
time we associate with possible Warsaw Pact preparations for war with NATO
in Central Europe have increased significantly from those set forth in
and finally in April
1990 NIE 12 - 90 "The Future of Eastern Europe":
Pact as a military alliance is essentially dead, and Soviet efforts to
convert it in to a political alliance will ultimately fail
A striking example
for the difficulties intelligence analysts face at times of an unprecedented
acceleration of history, as in the period from 1989 to 1991 is the German
unification within NATO.
in the unification within NATO happened so unexpectedly that it does not
even appear in the Estimates. But already NIE 12-90 from April 1990 presented
key judgements on the future role of Germany in Eastern Europe:
Germany however will move even more assertively into Eastern Eupope as
an economic and political influence in the vanguard of the European Community.
This will be a source of worry for most East Europeans, particularly the
Poles.... German influence will be somewhat diluted as other Western countries
also build economic and political ties to the region. Even so, Germany`s
weight and occasional insensitivity will raise hackles.
At the same time one
of the key conclusions of NIE 12-90, judging on the future role of the
United States in Eastern Europe stated:
are better positioned to lead in shaping the East European future, but
the United States has important advantages, among them the desire of East
Europeans for an counterweight to Soviet and German influence.
The documents published
in "At Cold War`s End" give a deep and may be unique insight in the collecting
and analyzing capacity of the US Intelligence Community and show how the
interpreted and predicted developments in the Soviet Union ans Eastern
Europe during the collapse of communism and the Soviet system.
All in all the
NIEs and the other documents reprinted in "At Cold War`s End" provided
vital and timely information to American policy-makers when for "a brief
span of time the extraordinary became an almost daily event." At a time
when Gorbomania was popular in Western Europe the NIE`s warned that Gorbachev’s
intentions to reform communism were doomed to failure.
James D. Calder,
Espionage and Related Topics: An Annotated Bibliography of Serial, Journal,
and Magazine Scholarship, 1844-1998. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
In a new Century
characterized by the Internet, computerized databases and electronic archives,
a new traditional hardcover bibliography may at first sound outmoded. But
James Calder’s new addition to the world of intelligence studies seems
to defy both time and scope. Indeed, this monumental bibliography fulfils
a need that is long overdue, in covering not books but journal and magazine
articles in its field. Whereas a series of books published by ABC Clio
Press several years ago cover intelligence bibliographies of individual
countries, notably Britain, France and Israel, this new bibliography is
far wider in its scope and deals with all aspects of intelligence, espionage
and security issues which are related to intelligence as well.
James Calder, Professor
of Criminal Justice at the University of Texas, set out to chart articles
dealing with intelligence and espionage, which appeared in scholarly journals
and magazine from 1844 to 1998. Over 150 years of articles are listed by
author, many with a brief summary or abstract. Also included is an extensive
indexing by keywords and terms, as well as a co-author index.
The first thing
the reader notices in this new book is its sheer size. The annotated bibliography
part encompasses over 1200 pages and includes well over ten thousand individual
entries. The meticulously-researched entries include dozens of well known
journals, but it also covers numerous journals and sources which the average
intelligence scholar may not be familiar with, such as the Colorado Quarterly,
Criminal Law Bulletin, Government Publications Review, Joint Forces Quarterly,
even the Jerusalem Journal of International Relations. Also included are
dozens of journals in foreign languages, including French, Italian, Russian
and many more.
the entries, one is amazed by the amount of work that must have gone into
locating numerous little known or even obscure sources. A quick search
in connection with one of my current projects found J. Talmon’s article
on the Lavon Affair, published in New Outlook of 1961, as well as Bradley
Day’s article on American Civil War intelligence published in a 1968 issue
of Quaker History. With so many thousands of entries, a quick search may
however turn into a long night’s reading, so all you intelligence fans
The book is easy
to use and is not cluttered with mysterious acronyms or technical jargon.
It does seem a pity, however, that the publishers did not include with
the book a searchable version on CD-ROM. The production costs of CD-ROMs,
even in small quantities, have fallen so much recently that more and more
publishers are including a CD with books, for easy search capabilities.
For its hefty price tag, a CD-ROM included with Calder’s book would have
made searching this wonderful database so much easier. A second alternative
could perhaps be to place the book’s database on the Internet and provide
buyers with a password or a similar secure way to access the material.
With a price tag
of 112.50 Pounds Sterling (about $180), Calder’s book may not fit everyone’s
wallet. However, it is an essential book for any reference and university
library dealing with intelligence. Calder’s extraordinary work will remain,
for years to come, the standard bibliographic reference work for journal
sources on intelligence. As such, it is highly recommended for scholars
of intelligence and security, as well as for history scholars interested
in espionage and its military or political contexts.
terrorista – Odisseya Yakova Blumkina. Moscow: Sovremmenik Publishers,
1998. ISBN 5270016265
Oleg Shishkin, Bitva za Gimalai. NKVD: Magiya i spionazh.
Moscow: Olma Press Publishers, 1999. ISBN 5224002524
In the history of secret services human tragedy and unintended
comedy are often not far apart. Proof of this is to be found in two books
recently published in Russia. Velidov is the author of "The Adventure of
a Terrorist – the Odyssey of Yakov Blumkin", the first biography substantiated
by many hitherto unknown documents, of the Social Revolutionary and later
agent of the GPU, Yakov Blumkin, notorious for his assassination of the
German ambassador Count Mirbach in 1918. His life span was 29 years only.
He was born in 1900 in a Jewish family, orphaned early in life and grew
up in Odessa. He took an active part in the Russian Revolution an became
a member of the Tcheka in 1918. On orders of the leadership of the Social
Revolutionaries Party he assassinated the German ambassador in Moscow,
but in 1919 he broke with the Social Revolutionaries, made an open confession
and was pardoned. Blumkin took part in the civil war as a commander in
the Red Army, he studied at a military academy, and in 1923, on the advice
of Dzierzynski, he joined the foreign department of the secret police GPU,
later called NKVD. He served as chief instructor of the state security
service in Mongolia, as a resident in Palestine, Syria, Egypt and Turkey
and on secret missions in Germany, France and China. Blumkin`s occasional
emotional escapades were condoned in these years, but when he met with
Trotsky, whom he admired, after Trotsky had been expelled from the Soviet
Union in 1929, he was caught in the meshes of Stalin`s machinery of repression.
Blumkin´s mistress, also a member of the secret police, mercilessly
denounced him, he was lured into a trap and then executed. As a Jew, blumkin
owed his emancipation to the Russian Revolution of 1917, but then he became
one of its numerous victims.
Velidov briefly refers to the expeditions into the Himalayan
made by the NKVD. They are dealt with in detail by O. Shishkin in his sensationally
titled book "The struggle for the Himalayan – The NKVD : Magic and Espionage".
Freemasons, Rosicrucians and Spiritists have a long tradition in Russia.
Also after the Revolution of 1917 attempts were made to combine such trends
with Buddhistic Ideas in order to develop a sort of high-minded communism.
In the nineteen twenties the NKVD financed several expeditions into Tibet
in search of the mythical city of Shambala whose inhabitants were reputed
to possess telepathic faculties and ancient lore. These expeditions were
led by the well-known artist Nikolai Rerikh and sponsored at first by Dzierzynski
and after his death by Gleb Bokiy, head of the special department of the
NKVD. Yakov Blumkin was a chief agent in all of them, disguised as a Buddhistic
lama or as organizer of the Mongolian "Blumkin People`s University." The
city of Shambala, however, was not to be found, and all the scientists
and secret service man who took part in the search, including Bokiy, were
put to death during the repressions of 1937. A touch of irony is added
by the fact that in 1990 and 1991 the KGB, then headed by Kryutchkov, seriously
considered posthumously conferring the title "Hero of the Soviet Union"
on Blumkin for his merits in the struggle for Tibet.
David Kohnen, Commanders Winn and Knowles: Winning
the U-Boat War with Intelligence, 1939-1943. Krakow: The Enigma Press,
1999. ISBN 8386110341
The author, archivist of the Mariner’s Museum at Newport
News, Virginia, USA, found in our member Zdzislaw J.Kapera, of Krakow,
Poland, a publisher much engaged in the history of the German cipher machine
‘Enigma’. David Kohnen centered his study on the two heads of the Submarine
Tracking Rooms in London and Washington, Rodger (not Roger) Winn and Kenneth
A. Knowles, reminding the readers of the most important role both men played
during the decisive phases of the Battle of the Atlantic.
He starts out with a short description of the participation
of American naval officers in operations of British warships and aircraft
in the Atlantic before Pearl Harbor, so f.i. when a young Ensign Leonard
B. Smith on 26th May 1941 aboard a British ‘Catalina’ flyingboat
sighted the Bismarck, running for a French base, which led to her
interception and destruction. He also mentions the several meetings of
high ranking officers on both sides of the ocean in preparing the joint
war plans, and establishing the first contacts for close cooperation in
intelligence gathering and its use by the operational staffs. But Kohnen
does no evade the difficulties, the initial mistrust, the prejudices, the
service rivalries, and so on, which had to be overcome first, until finally
the ‘very special relationship’ between the Government Code & Cipher
School at Bletchley Park and the Op-20-G, and especially the Submarine
Tracking Room under Rodger Winn at the Admiralty in London and its American
counterpart at COMINCH in Washington under Kenneth Knowles, was achieved.
The establishment of the American tracking room was to a great extent a
consequence of Winn’s visit to Washington and his meeting with the new
C-in-C of the U.S. Navy and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J.
King, in spring 1942, and Knowles’ tour in the summer of 1942 to learn
how the British Operational Intelligence Centre and the Submarine Tracking
Room worked. The resulting friendship between Winn, his assistant Patrick
Beesly, and Knowles was the basis for a very close cooperation in the tracking
of German U-boats, leading to increased successes from autumn 1942 to the
end of the war. Kohnen does not forget mentioning the links to the Canadian
tracking room under John B. McDiarmid at Ottawa. This writer remembers
the impressive relationship between the ‘back room boys’, who had so decisive
a part in the victory in the Battle of the Atlantic, when, unfortunately
after the death of Winn-Beesly, Knowles and I presented papers under the
chair of Sir Norman Denning (the founder and most important man in the
O.i.C. in London) about the role of SIGINT in the Battle of the Atlantic
at the Naval History Conference at Annapolis in 1977, and the meeting of
Beesly, McDiarmid, and myself during the 70th birthday colloquy
of the Royal Canadian Navy at Royal Roads near Victoria in 1980. We must
be very grateful to David Kohnen for reminding us of the development of
the American-British-Canadian SIGINT cooperation and especially for providing
us with a vivid description of Rodger Winn and Kenneth Knowles.
Patrick Beesly, Very Special Intelligence. The Admiralty’s
Operational Intelligence Centre, 1939-1945. With a new introduction
by W.J.R. Gardner and a new afterword by Ralph Erskine. London: Greenhill
Books/Pennsylvania, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000. ISBN 1853673986.
When in late 1974 Frederick W. Winterbotham’s book The
Ultra Secret was published, I immediately phoned Patrick Beesly, –
we had corresponded for some years about the Battle of the Atlantic –,
and asked him: "Patrick, is this true?", he answered: "Yes, but I was not
allowed to tell you earlier, but what Winterbotham says about the Navy
is not true." I said: "Patrick, sit down and write your story!" He started
with some articles in the British Naval Review and in the Marine-
Rundschau, and then his book Very Special Intelligence followed,
translated by Captain Friedrich Forstmeier, Chief of the Militärgeschichtliches
Forschungsamt, for the German edition Geheimdienstkrieg der britischen
Admiralität 1939-1945, presented to the public during a reception
at the Rhein Hotel Dreesen in Bad Godesberg at the great symposium
"Die Funkaufklärung und ihre Rolle in Zweiten Weltkrieg", at which
many participants in the cryptanalytic efforts in Great Britain, the United
States, Canada, Germany and other nations, as well as veterans from both
sides of the Battle of the Atlantic participated. This meeting established
a real ‘band of brothers’ working on the history of the signal intelligence
in World War Two, and it was followed by many other colloquies on both
sides of the Atlantic.
Patrick Beesly's well written volume, re-published now
in the original form, gives a vivid description of the birth and the development
of the Operational Intelligence Centre of the British Admiralty and the
role of its founder and brain, Norman Denning. Now he could tell what his
predecessor Donald McLachlan in his book of 1968 Room 39. Naval Intelligence
in Action 1939- 1945 had to conceal, the important influence the decryption
of the German naval cipher machines ‘M-3’ and ‘M-4’ had for the surface
naval operations and especially for the Battle of the Atlantic. From his
own experience, first as member of the surface division and from late 1941
as deputy head of the Submarine Tracking Room, but also with access to
the first to the Public Records Office released ‘Ultra’ documents, he could
meticulously describe the difficult times of the first two years, during
which the German xB-Dienst was more successful, until, after first delayed
breaks, in August 1941 the analytical decryption at Bletchley Park started
and led to the successful routing of the convoys round the German ‘wolf
packs.’ But he looks not only at the U-Boat war, where he shows the difficulties
during the great ‘black out’ from February to December 1942, and the problems
to find ways into the U-Boat cipher ‘Triton’ again with all the ups and
downs, but also at the role signal intelligence played during the Bismarck-operation
with all its mistakes, the failures with the Channel-Dash of the German
battleships or the PQ- 17 convoy battle, and during the battle with the
the sinking of the Tirpitz. Not less important are his many observations
about the most important men in the British naval intelligence, his uncle,
Rear Admiral John Godfrey, the Director of Naval Intelligence, F. Harry
Hinsley at Bletchley Park, Norman Denning at the O.I.C. and his chief at
the S.T.R., Rodger Winn, but also the American and Canadian counterparts,
Kenneth Knowles and John McDiarmid.
We must be very grateful to Lionel Leventhal of Greenhill
Books for re-publishing this most important book about the naval war 1939-1945
as seen from the ‘back rooms’ of the British Admiralty, and for asking
two great experts to write a new introduction and an afterword. ‘Jock’
Gardner from the Naval Historical Branch in London, who himself published
articles and a most important and competent book on this topic, gives a
broad and instructive overview about the historiography of the naval war
and the Battle of the Atlantic and the role ‘Ultra’ was assigned to it
by the authors since Patrick Beesly’s book, which he still considers ground
breaking. And Ralph Erskine, well known for his many articles on the technical
details of the ‘Enigma’ and the German rules to use this machine, as well
as to the ways taken to break into this system, published in the journals
and National Security and Cryptologia, delineates in his afterword
the results of the 25-years of research into the role of signal intelligence
in the Battle of the Atlantic.
So even the owners of the original edition of Patrick
Beesly’s book, but also all historians and readers interested in the naval
warfare must read and use this new edition of Very Special Intelligence
with its most important introduction and afterword, to be up to date!
Joseph Mark Scalia, Germany‘s Last Mission to Japan.
The Failed Voyage of U 234. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press,
2000. ISBN 1557508119
For many years the story of U 234 and its voyage
to Japan which ended in the United States, but especially its load of passengers
and materials including 560 kilogram of ‘uranium oxide’ have captivated
the international media, often with greatly distorted stories, f.i. in
a joint American-Japanese-German TV-film The Last U-Boat, or in
some articles and books, speculating about German assistance for a Japanese
atomic weapon or even the use of the German 'uranium' in the two American
atomic bombs used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The American historian Joseph Mark Scalia, who served
from 1989-1997 as an enemy ordnance disposal Seabee diver in the U.S. Naval
Reserves, has tried with success to reveal the real history of the journey
of U 234, its pre-history, the proceedings during the voyage, the
background of the officers and passengers, and the events of the capture
and the disposal of the loads.
He used all the relevant documents in the National Archives,
finding many details which were not used by others before, and he interviewed
all the still living participants of the events aboard the U-Boats and
in the United States, as well as experts in Germany and Japan. He shows
that the decryption of the Japanese messages between the Ambassador Oshima
Hiroshi and his military attachés in Berlin and Tokyo as well as
some decrypted German naval signals gave the Allied intelligence good knowledge
about the planned task of U 234 and the identity of the passengers,
including the two Japanese naval officers, Tomonaga Hideo and Shoji Genzo.
In the first part Scalia describes the development of
the German-Japanese co-operation and the use of surface ships and submarines
in the effort to transfer personnel and materials back and forth.
Then follows the preparation of the journey of U 234,
journey up to the messages about the end of the war and the decision of
the commanding officer to surrender to the Americans, the suicide of the
two Japanese, and the arrival at Portsmouth, with a critical description
of the behaviour of some of the American guards against the now prisoners
of war, and the unloading of the U-Boat. Most important is the second part
with detailed personal stories of the officers and passengers and a painstaking
description of their projected tasks in Japan in connection with the materials
the U-Boat transported. lt becomes clear that the most important task was
the German assistance for the Japanese air defense by the German experts,
the blueprints of German weapons, including anti-air rockets, and dismounted
German jet- and rocket planes (Me-262 and Me-163).
In a special appendix Scalia presents his research results
about the 'uran oxide', starting with the information of Prof. Kigoshi
Kunihiko, then a young assistant to Prof. Nishina Yoshio, the leading Japanese
nuclear scientist, about the state of the Japanese nuclear research, which
was far behind the Americans and even the Germans, and the background of
the requests to Germany in 1943 to send 'uran oxide', which was to be used
for experiments in the enrichrnent of uranium. Scalia then describes the
sources for the diverse legends about the final disposal of the 'uranium
oxide', and in a detailed comparison of all relevent materials comes to
the conclusion that the 'uranium oxide' in July 1945 ended up in a warehouse
in Brooklyn. Even if the final whereabouts of the material remains unclear,
Scalia comes to the conclusion that "U 234‘s
consignment of uranium
oxide was not indicative of any large-scale Axis program, nor did it provide
American authorities with any substantial windfall of unique value".