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Michael Smith, The Spying Game: The Secret History of British Espionage.
London: Politico’s, 2003. ISBN 184275 0046, £9.99
(Expanded and updated edition of New Cloak, Old Dagger, 1996)

Michael Smith, defence correspondent of the British paper The Daily Telegraph and an accomplished writer on intelligence matters, has written a valuable history of British intelligence. It is well-written and balanced. Quite a few books have been published in the last few decades about the history of separate British intelligence organisations and many monographs have been published on different episodes from their history. As a recent example, Stephen Dorril’s voluminous MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service (New York etc.: The Free Press, 2000, 907pp.) comes to mind. Smith has chosen a different approach in dealing with British intelligence history in that he gives roughly equal space to the histories of the three most important British services: MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. Several chapters deal with military intelligence and what the author calls ‘parallel diplomacy’. More on the latter topic later.
In the chapters on the history of the organizations mentioned several well-known episodes are discussed such as the Double Cross system during World War II, the breaking of the German Enigma and the Cambridge Five. Much has already been written on these subjects, but Smith draws attention to several interesting but sometimes neglected aspects of these already well-covered cases. He mentions, for instance, the great importance of the work of Bletchley Park to the Double Cross system, a topic that often tends to be forgotten as most of the attention of intelligence historians goes to the other Sigint triumphs during the war, e.g. the one related to the Battle of the Atlantic. Smith argues that the biggest contribution of Bletchley Park, certainly if it came to the D-Day landings in Normandy, had to do with the Double Cross system. The intelligence called Ultra which resulted from the broken Enigma codes revealed that the Germans believed every detail of the Allied deception plan concerning the place and time of the D-Day landings. The author also discusses briefly Ultra’s contribution to the German airborne landing in Crete in May 1941. The New Zealand commander at the scene, general Freyburg, knew from Ultra when the landing was due, but he simply did not have the forces available to fight off the German attack. The German airborne operation was therefore successful, but at such enormous cost that Hitler did not use his paratroopers again for similar operations for the remainder of the war. The Crete operation offers a good example of intelligence making a difference in battle, but not in the sense that the side who had it at its disposal gained a victory.
This book abounds with interesting observations and bits of information. The author makes the telling point, for instance, that the relationship between the American intelligence and security services over the past fifty years has been so bad at times that their relationship with their British counterparts often was much better than the one they enjoyed with each other. In discussing the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), one of the pillars of the British intelligence establishment, he mentions that it usually meets once a week and is made up of senior Foreign Office and Treasury officials, the heads of MI5, MI6, GCHQ and several other high intelligence officials. An interesting detail here is that liaison officers from the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand also attend some of the meetings, which is an illustration of what is probably the most durable intelligence liaison in recent world history. On the importance of the US-British intelligence relationship generally, the author quotes former American Secretary of State Dean Rusk who once said:
In the intelligence field, the US and the UK give each other a greater volume and wider variety of information than either does to any of its other allies. The arrangements provide for exchange of information gathered both from overt and covert sources; for the swapping of estimates; and for the preparation of joint estimates. There is a division of labor in certain geographic and functional fields, and on some areas and subjects, each nation is dependent for its intelligence mainly on the other.
In another paragraph, Smith mentions as if in passing that British Petroleum is among a number of British companies with close relations to MI6. According to the author, senior BP executives have even been on the distribution lists for the reports of MI6. Occasionally, observations by the author are contradicted by information that has become available in the public domain since the publication of this book. He writes, for instance, that on the eve of the 2003 war against Iraq MI6 had a ‘surprising number of agents in Iraq, including long-term penetration agents’. Much is still unclear about the intelligence aspects of this war, but from the stack of reports written since, British and American, one can surely conclude that Humint on the part of the British and Americans was sorely lacking.
At the end of the book there are two interesting chapters on what the author calls ‘parallel diplomacy’ about which he rightly says that it is ‘one of the least discussed uses of the intelligence services’. Parallel diplomacy, in his view, concerns the establishment of ‘communications with the enemy that would be too dangerous, both physically and politically, for ministers or ordinary civil servants too contemplate.’ As Smith observes, the practice of parallel diplomacy is not the exclusive domain of the British services. Both the CIA and the Mossad had secret back-channels to the PLO that were used at the time when the Oslo peace talks were being explored, and the South African National Intelligence Service (NIS) played an important part in negotiations with Nelson Mandela and other ANC leaders on an end to the Apartheid regime. The British service MI6 has been involved in parallel diplomacy, particularly in Northern Ireland, where it has kept open communication channels with the IRA over the years, but it has also taken part in secret peace negotiations in places such as Angola, Mozambique and the former Yugoslavia. According to Smith, an important advantage of such contacts lies in the fact that they take place outside the glare of the media spotlights that would otherwise make them vulnerable to all kinds of political and public pressure much more easily. Such communication channels are also deniable for a politician as he or she could simply say, if necessary, that they were unauthorised. An intelligence officer in contact with, say, a terrorist organization, could express ideas for a settlement or a truce, which could then later be taken up by his or her political masters. If it would be judged politically expedient those ideas could easily be discarded as well. An additional important advantage of such contacts lies in the fact that they usually provide intelligence about the adversary, even if they do not result in real political negotiations in the end. Smith gives some interesting examples of this.
My one problem with this book is that in this edition for reasons of space the notes have been left out by the publisher, which for obvious reasons diminishes its value considerably. A partial even if not wholly satisfactory solution for this problem could have been to make the sources available on the internet.

Ben de Jong
University of Amsterdam

Bodo Wegmann, Die Militäraufklärung der NVA
Berlin: Verlag Dr. Köster, 2005. 48 €, ISBN 3895745804

Since the German reunification a lot was published about the civil intelligence service of the former German Democratic Republic (the so called State Security Service, STASI). However little was known about the military intelligence of the National Peoples Army of the GDR. In his doctoral thesis Bodo Wegmann presents a detailed picture of the structure and the functioning of this secret service. The book provides a complete overview of the information which is publicly available. The documentation of the sources proves the high scientific standard of the author. The book focuses mainly on the anatomy of the organization rather than on its results but gives examples for the latter as well.
How to review 714 small printed pages? One can give only a rough idea about the content of the book. It starts with a description of the history of the service and shows the political influence of the national Defence Council and the minister responsible. In the following chapters the different divisions of the service are described. For every division information in detail is provided about the availability of sources, the task of the division and of its subdivisions. In addition the chapters describe the modes of operation, examples for results, biographical data of the heads of division and if appropriate details of the buildings used.

Division 1: Central Management
Its task was to lead and optimize the the organization. The officer on top was a general with the exception of the year 1957–1959 where a colonel led the service. The commander was supported by his deputies and by his stuff. As a rule the deputies were on top of the following subdivisions: finance, personnel (cadre), education of agents and political control. The political influence of the communist party on the army was even established in the case of the military intelligence service. Concerning the staff Wegmann stresses that it was organized different of a normal military staff. In an army information is widespread amongst the members of a staff and it is the commanding officer who gets selected information as a basis for his decisions. However intelligence services very often are governed by the so called “need to know” principle where employees get only access to that parts of information which they definitely need to do their job. Therefore the flow of information in the stuff was organized like an inverse pyramid – the officer on top was the person to know everything! From this the supporting capacity of the staff was very limited.

Divison 2: HUMINT
Its task was to collect information by people in an illegal manner (spies). The subdivision foreign agents dealt with citizens of foreign countries (the FRG being one of them) who were recruited to work for GDR’s intelligence. The author describes methods of recruitment, supervision by controlling officers and examples of important spies or espionage networks. Another subdivision was in charge of citizens of the GDR who worked under cover in abroad (so called “illegals”). Again methods of recruitment, training, the creation of legends, the procedures of infiltration are shown and biographical data of “illegals” are given. The distinction between the two categories of spies was not just an administrative one but had political implications. It was forbidden to recruit members of the communist parties abroad as agents. After 1990 the minister of defence in the democratic government of the GDR Rainer Eppelmann made a clear distinction when it came to cancelling of files before reunification. The files of citizens of the GDR were removed because they did not violate their national laws whereas the files of the others were not destroyed. The third division handled reconnaissance forces with diplomatic status – military attaches and other diplomats. Contrary to the sowjet military attaches they had the order just to collect open source information and to stay within the limits of the Vienna Convention

Division 3:
Operativ-tactical reconnaissance
One subdivision used optical observation, pathfinders and a lot of technical methods, e.g. operational and air reconnaissance. The second subdivision was in charge of SIGINT. The author describes the different units and their geographical deployment. The author considers himself that the technical part is not his speciality and refers to the books of Rudolf Grabau (and nowadays Günter K. Weiße; the reviewer). The third subdivison organized the border reconnaissance by observations of the border troops.

Division 4: Analysis of information
Its task was to make an appraisal of the situation and to deliver forecasts. It combined information from divisions two and three with own open source intelligence. At the beginning the division was directly under the control of the general on top. In the sixties it got its own director (the chief of information) who served at the same time as deputy of the head of the service. The structure of the division changed over the years but always covered geographical elements ( e.g. armed forces FRG) as well as thematic elements like armament or OSINT. In 1964 a situation centre was established and at the end of the sixties the division started to use information technology. Before the archive was organized on the basis of filing cards. Contrary to the habits of the State Security only important and actual information were conserved. From this the archive was more effective.

Divison 5: Backup
The division was in charge of a wide spectrum of tasks. Apart from buildings, logistics, medical service and cars it provided with communication and operative technology. The most important subdivision organized radiocommunication from the headquarters to the various agents in the field and vice versa. In this chapter the historical development the centres for radiocommunication is described. The author stresses the importance of encryption for clandestine radio. However no technical details about the ciphers used are presented – might be due to a lack of sources. More sources were available concerning the subdivision operative technology. The development of this sector is described and some examples for sophisticated devices are given.

Cooperation
Apart from the functioning and the structure of the service Wegmann also describes in the following chapter in detail the international cooperation with the Sowiet Union (GRU) and other military intelligence services from Warsaw Pact states. There has been a geographical distribution of tasks. The heads of the services met annually and on special occasions. Results but no original documents were exchanged on a bilateral basis. The main national partner for cooperation was the State Security which gained no military intelligence itself. The cooperation took place on the basis of fixed agreements.
Finally Wegmann argues with the brake-up of the service in 1990 and the destruction of files an presents in the last chapter conclusions.
The book is not easy to read but is a necessity for everybody who works scientifically on intelligence services.

Gerhard Schmid

Alain Dewerpe. Espion. Une anthropologie historique du secret d'État contemporain
Paris: Gallimard, 1994. €26,68. ISBN 2070737799

The book has been highly praised by the former of French military intelligence, Admiral Pierre Lacoste, and the author is the Director of Studies of the French École des hautes études en sciences sociales. Therefore, the book should make interesting reading, and it does.
The author describes the various aspects of secret intelligence in detail and he quotes from an impressive number of books.
But the reader expecting a traditional historical anthropology will be disappointed. It is a structuralist analysis. Dewerpe says so himself. He wants to support the hypothesis, “that contemporary society has constructed its own disposition of the secret, socially determined by the historically constructed uses, which are suggested to it by the structure of the political sector of public opinion, which was historically constructed itself” (p. 15).
Structuralism concentrates on published texts. The names and the professional qualifications of the authors are of minor importance; their statements tend to be accepted at face-value and to be turned into general assessments by frequently quoting them without mentioning the name of the author; influential writers might be ignored, as it is the text that matters and not the author; and the historical context is of minor importance if at all.
Correspondingly, Dewerpe never talked to any of the anthropoi nor did he study any of the unpublished records of intelligence services. It doesn't make any difference for him, whether the author is General Lewal or Balzac, Dumas and Dickens, a Lieutenant Froment or Edmond Lajoux, though Froment just compiled a lot of newspaper reports on German military intelligence for his L'Espionnage militaire of 1887, while Lajoux's Mes souvenirs d'espionnage of 1905 are the reminiscences of a French agent who successfully infiltrated German military intelligence, as the contemporary head of the German General Staff's section III B fooled by him, Major Karl Brose, later admitted. Dewerpe quotes Clausewitz, but Jomini has escaped his attention, and so has the first bestseller of intelligence literature, Victor Tissot's La police secrète prussienne, which was published in 1884, reprinted twelve time in the same year and once again in 1886. And while mentioning the famous Wilhelm Stieber and calling him him "the German master-spy" (p. 164), Dewerpe never explains why.
Espion is a structuralist presentation of the public image of secret intelligence. It should be required reading for the public relations officers of intelligence services because it demonstrates what they are up against.

Hilmar-Detlef Brückner
München

Karl de Leeuw and Jan Bergstra, eds. The History of Information Security: A Comprehensive Handbook
Elsevier: Amsterdam, 2007. $220; €180; £125 ISBN-13: 9780444516084

This is a massive tome, measuring 19.5 x 27 cms., and weighing 2.2 kgs., so that it can only be comfortably read at a desk. It’s a reference work, aimed at libraries – few individuals are likely to buy it, especially at €180. Its 29 chapters cover a huge range of subjects, ranging from Jack Meadows in Part I on the publication of scientific research to Dan Kuehl on information warfare (Part VI).
Part I (intellectual ownership) also includes papers on the modern German patent system (which recognises inventions by company employees, and provides for compensation to them) from a comparative perspective, and histories of copyright and the media and of copyright protection of computer software, and of software patents. Karel Schell contributes a fascinating history of document security, mainly about banknotes, to Part II, which has three other chapters on identity management.
While many of these chapters are interesting in their own right, readers of this journal are most likely to be interested in Part III’s nine chapters on communication security. It opens with Gerhard Strasser on “The rise of cryptology in the European renaissance”. Karl de Leeuw’s case-study of “Cryptology in the Dutch Republic” is first-class, but perhaps somewhat specialised for this handbook.
Friedrich Bauer’s “Rotor machines and bombes” is a masterly survey of the development of rotor cipher machines such as Enigma and the more advanced American M-134-C Sigaba (also known as the Electric Cipher Machine Mark II). He also explains many of the methods used to solve Wehrmacht Enigma, mainly with the British and US Navy bombes (fast key-finding aids). Some Wehrmacht Enigma ciphers were extremely difficult to break. In December 1942, Bletchley Park could only solve the Gadfly Enigma key (used by Fliegerkorps X in Greece) for three days. Aegir (Pike), employed by the Kriegsmarine’s auxiliary cruisers such as Atlantis from at least 1941 onwards, was not broken until June 1945.
B. Jack Copeland’s chapter on breaking Lorenz SZ 40/42 (Tunny) traffic with the Colossus electronic computer is an excellent summary of a complex subject. Colossus entered service in February 1944, but Bletchley had attacked Tunny manually from 1941 onwards. “Depths” (messages transmitted with identical machine settings) enabled Bletchley to read most Tunny messages on a Berlin-Athens link from June to October 1942. Tunny decrypts revealed, as early as September 1942, that the Kriegsmarine’s codebreakers in the B-Dienst were solving the principal Allied code used by the Atlantic convoys. Unfortunately, due to a major blunder it was not replaced until June 1943.
Copeland repeats the claim that Winston Churchill ordered Colossi to be broken up in 1945. All but two Colossi were indeed destroyed as no longer needed: Colossus was very specialised, and not a true general purpose computer. Junior staff were told that the destruction was on Churchill’s orders, but only to spur them on. The Churchill claim is a Bletchley myth, without any documentary support: clearly no one would have bothered Churchill, who left office before the war ended and was burdened with massive problems, with a decision to destroy only some equipment.
Sylvan Frik writes about Boris Hagelin and Crypto AG, the company Hagelin founded to make his cipher machines. But he was scarcely the best choice for a “warts and all” account, since he is Crypto AG’s head of marketing. Thus there is no mention of Hagelin’s meetings with the National Security Agency’s William F. Friedman in the 1950s, or of a curious incident in which Hans Buehler, a Crypto AG salesman, was arrested by the Iranians for allegedly spying for the United States and Germany (see further http:// jya.com/nsa-sun.htm).
Matthew Aid’s admirable review of KGB Sigint during the Cold War concentrates on organisational matters. He uses Russian sources to show that internecine warfare between the KGB, the GRU and other Soviet Sigint agencies hampered efficiency, as one would expect with a dictatorship, as did their lack of modern computers and good communication facilities.
Joseph Fitsanakis’s study of the National Security Agency (NSA) mainly deals with the period from the end of the Korean War until the invasion of Iraq. But despite his citation of 290 references, many questions remain unanswered about the intelligence NSA has produced. Regrettably, this is unavoidable, given NSA’s refusal to declassify virtually all of its post-war files. A rare exception occurred too late for this book, when NSA confirmed that some wartime US Navy bombes were used in 1956 to solve East German police traffic in case it contained intelligence about the CIA’s Berlin Tunnel. It’s unfortunate that Fitsanakis repeats the charge that Herbert Yardley, the head of the American “Black Chamber”, sold American cryptographic secrets to the Japanese, without referring to David Kahn’s refutation of this in The Reader of Gentlemen's Mail (2004), which he fails to cite.
Bart Preneel’s “Introduction to modern cryptography” gives an overview of cryptographic algorithms, and short explanations of stream ciphers, block ciphers, public-key systems, digital signatures, and more. However, his statement that “Most of the rotor machines are additive stream ciphers” is very puzzling. Wired rotor machines used polyalphabetic substitution – teleprinter cipher machines such as Tunny or Sturgeon (the Siemens T 52) employed additive streams, but they did not use wired rotors and are therefore not rotor machines as generally known.
Part IV (computer security) covers “security models”, “computer security through correctness and transparency”, “IT security and auditing”, and histories of “computer security standards”, “internet security” and “computer crime”. Part V (privacy and export regulations) includes Whitfield Diffie’s and Susan Landau’s “The export of cryptography in the 20th and the 21st centuries”, which has already appeared in Sun Microsystems Laboratories: the First Ten Years 1991-2001 (download at http:// research.sun.com/techrep/Perspectives /PS-01-5.pdf), except for two short paragraphs on the aftermath of September 11th. It also comprises “The changing interface between privacy and encryption policy” on attempts by countries to restrict access to strong cryptography, and the effect of legislation such as the Digital Millenium Copyright Act 1998 on encryption research, and “The history of privacy”.
In chapter 29, “The information revolution and the transformation of warfare”, Dan Kuehl concentrates on the protection of computer-controlled critical infrastructures, the importance of information operations to the US and its allies and the struggle for global influence in the “war of ideas”. However, the information revolution (which includes the somewhat vaguely-defined “information operations”) is so important a subject that it is disappointing to find it discussed in a mere 11 pages, mainly from an American viewpoint.
This book is very ambitious and wide-ranging in its scope, which has contributed to its huge size. Some chapters seem to have been completed by mid-2005, and are therefore not quite as up-to-date as one might expect. It has relatively few misprints, considering that English is not the mother tongue of the editors or many of the authors. Some minor repetitions in different chapters should have been eliminated: the 1988 Morris worm incident is dealt with three times. The main index should have been expanded, since this is a reference book. However, these are minor blemishes in a major work. Overall, one must be very impressed by the enormous amount of time and effort that the editors and authors have put into this well-produced volume, which will be a real, if expensive, asset to any library with an information security section.

Ralph Erskine
Belfast