The 9/11 massacres and the war on terror catapulted Pakistan – and its premier secret service, the Directorate-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) – from the margins of world politics into its most turbulent epicenter. No one experienced the shock more brutally than ISI chief Lieutenant-General Mahmud Ahmed: Preparing on that very Black Tuesday to board a flight home after a routine and rather friendly Washington, D.C., visit, he was summoned from the airport for a thorough tongue-lashing and a virtual ultimatum from Secretary of State Collin Powell on his country’s and his service’s links with the Taliban. Mahmud would spend the next two months in hasty and futile maneuvers to prevent the upcoming war, only to be summarily sacked on the first day of the US attack on Afghanistan. His humiliation symbolized the collapse of the ISI’s long-running double game of simultaneous co-operation with the Americans and with their Islamist enemies; and since then it has been constantly under the international community’s cold, suspicious gaze, most acutely when its involvement in Kashmiri terrorism provoked India into massive military sabre-rattling with hints of nuclear brinkmanship. In short: the ISI is no longer a regional South Asian issue, it is a global one.
A comprehensive history of the ISI has yet to be written; Khalid Muhammad Arif’s book provides some of the raw material for it, tantalizingly illuminating glimpses into its modus operandi. It is mainly a memoir of a career in the Pakistani Army which brought him the highest rank, a full four-star generalship. As vice chief of Army Staff during the military dictatorship of Zia ul-Haq, who doubled as president and chief of Army Staff, Arif was the effective day-to-day commander of the Army and one of the small coterie of officers who ruled Pakistan from Zia’s coup in 1977 until his own (somewhat forced) retirement in 1987 (Zia himself died in 1988 in an airline crash widely believed to have been an assassination). A staff officer with no specific intelligence training or experience, he was nevertheless closely involved in intelligence matters at the highest level, not least thanks to his close working relationship with Zia’s powerful and long-serving ISI chief, General Akhtar Abd-ur-Rahman. Arif vividly describes, for instance, how in 1980 they quickly nipped in the bud an attempted coup d’etat by a disgraced former major general and Islamist extremist, Tajammal Hussain Malik: Arif was woken up at night by a major from the Military Intelligence College in Murree who wished to unburden himself from the story of the conspiracy, and a series of urgent midnight phone calls to Akhtar ensured the arrest of the conspirators (in the regiment on presidential guard duty!) without even disturbing Zia’s sleep.
This, of course, is also revealing of the atmosphere of choking fear during the Zia years; and here Arif is less than forthright, uncomfortably moving between subdued criticism of his former master and, more often, transparent apologetics in the manner of a loyal retainer. He credits Zia and ISI chief Akhtar with the management of the guerrilla war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, especially the care taken to prevent direct CIA control of the Mujahidin commanders: Akhtar ordered all their meetings with CIA representatives to be held only in the presence of their ISI handlers, and Arif criticizes prime minister Benazir Bhutto for having weakened this policy later. But Arif keeps studiously mum on the question of the diversion of large sums from the CIA’s war fund into private pockets, not least into those of Zia’s and Akhtar’s sons (who are now, inexplicably, multimillionaires). On another great mystery of Pakistani history, the disappearance of Zia’s papers originally held by his widow, he gives such a vague and improbable account of his own role as to rouse the reader’s suspicion that he is hiding something in order to protect Zia’s reputation. This notwithstanding the rather undignified way in which Zia engineered Arif’s retirement in 1987, leaking to the press "from an intelligence agency" that he had lost confidence in him, and even subjecting him to surveillance: Arif indignantly describes how a fellow general alerted him to the capture of an agent monitoring him, inside military headquarters, obviously on orders of ISI chief Akhtar, but he could not bring himself to anything more than a sullen refusal to talk to Akhtar ever after. Such was life in Zia’s court.
Arif also provides here the most detailed insider account of an episode worthy of further intensive study, the Brass Tacks crisis of January 1987. A massive Indian Army exercise involving 200,000 troops on the India-Pakistan border led to a short war scare reminiscent of the recent showdown of 2001/ 2002. Pakistan suspected Indian "coercive diplomacy" and feared a surprise attack; Arif claims that ISI provided an accurate, detailed warning based on excellent information but also tended to a worst-case analysis of Indian intentions. He describes in detail the Pakistani decision-making process during the crisis, including being asked point blank by Prime Minister Junejo in one tense moment on the Cabinet Defence Committee: "Is war imminent?" Arif gives himself part of the credit for the cool Pakistani response which resolved the crisis, and this has the ring of truth; but it does not sufficiently take account of the internal developments in India, especially Indian chief-of-staff Sundarji’s failure of nerve after the Pakistani counter-deployment. Arif‘s account should stimulate further research of the Brass Tacks episode; it seems the huge literature on surprise and intelligence failure could profit from a case study of a successful warning, if indeed it was one.

Doron Arazi, Birmingham

Eric S. Ensign. Intelligence in the Rum War at Sea 1920-1933. Washington, D.C.: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2001. 92 pp.

The Prohibition era usually refers to the period from January 1920 until April 1933 when the National Prohibition Enforcement Act forbade the manufacture and sale of beverages with an alcoholic content greater than 0.5 percent in the United States. Although it outlawed the manufacture, sale, and transportation of alcohol, it made no provisions against buying or drinking it. However, when the experiment with Prohibition began, no one could have foreseen the magnitude of illegal liquor importation, leading to government corruption and organized crime on an unprecedented scale. As America’s thirst for alcohol grew, foreign distillers quickly responded and took over the role of the American liquor industry. By the middle of the 1920s it became clear that "Volsteadism" was presenting law enforcement agencies and government authorities with enormous problems. Stopping the illegal traffic seemed impossible. Plans to establish a naval blockade of the coasts and of closing the thousands of miles of borders along Canada and Mexico were discussed. The U.S. Coast Guard waged an unrelenting campaign to detect, monitor, apprehend, and support the prosecution of those who smuggled alcohol on the high seas and navigable waterways of the United States. The Coast Guard servicemen were regarded as "the last line of defense" to keep the enemy away from the coast.
Facing the task of defending the Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf of Mexico, and Great Lake shorelines, the Coast Guard quickly saw its enlargement through vessel acquisition and recruitment. In addition to this enlargement the Coast Guard and the Congress looked for other ways to even the score between the Coast Guard and the rum fleet. When realizing that these initial measures to combat the rum runners proved ineffective, the Coast Guard turned to intelligence to bridge the capabilities gap between well-organized smugglers and under-resourced law enforcement. And in fact, the development of an Intelligence Section marked the turning point in the Coast Guard´s favor in the Rum War. As a member of the Armed Forces, the Coast Guard, with domestic police power, found itself in a unique position to use all-source intelligence. However, the battle for information superiority was fought by both sides, but an understanding of the value of intelligence and the all-source approach of tapping the unique abilities of each intelligence discipline allowed the Coast Guard to support interdiction operations with well-fused intelligence. The use of the disciplines of Human Resources Intelligence, Communications Intelligence, Imaginary Intelligence and Open Source Intelligence as well as intelligence sharing between the Coast Guard and other federal agencies made possible frequent interdiction efforts.
This publication is based exclusively on declassified Coast Guard Intelligence Division sources available to the public at the National Archives, Washington, DC. The author, Eric S. Ensign, a USCG serviceman, spent his early career years in Florida, where he was responsible for intelligence support for U.S. counter-drug efforts. His study, which received the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint History Office´s Award for Excellence in Archival Research, brings to light the massive, all-source intelligence effort that provided the backbone of Coast Guard operations in the "Rum War at Sea". It shows how, through a concentrated interplay of intelligence and operations, the Coast Guard was able to obtain and maintain dominant battlespace knowledge. In his introducing chapter the author sets the scene before he describes the Coast Guard´s initial counter measures. He then turns the reader´s attention to the use of the various intelligence disciplines, explaining in detail how the intelligence tasks were carried out. At the conclusion of this study, the reader will understand how the fusion of intelligence and the Coast Guards enforcement strategy acted as a force multiplier, allowing the Coast Guard to use its dominant battlefield knowledge to its advantage in defeating a determined foe.
The lessons learned from the use of intelligence in the Rum War are fully applicable to today´s war on drugs. The value of intelligence as a force multiplier like that chronicled by the author can still not be overestimated. In light of the continuing counter-smuggling operations of the U.S. Coast Guard, efforts recently reinforced as part of the US effort against terrorism, this work holds enduring value not only for the historically interested reader but also for contemporary analysis as well.

Jan G. Heitmann, Hamburg

In April 2002, an edition was published in Berlin/FRG which is remarkable for the study of intelligence related contemporary history – because of its authors as well as because of its contents.

The Editors and Authors
„Die Sicherheit" was written by a group of 20 officers who had been in high and highest positions in the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (MfS, Ministry of State Security) of the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR, German Democratic Republic). Together, they served a total of 729 years in the MfS, most of them with an average period of service of 38 years.
It is the first time in history that such a group of intelligence professionals who had been on active duty until only a little more than a decade ago has published such a project. Among them are (in alphabetical order and with their former positions):
Karli Coburger (General, ret.: head main-dept. VIII/observation); Manfred Dietze (General, ret.: head main-dept. I/military counter-espionage); Siegfried Haehnel (General, ret.: head district office Berlin); Werner Irmler (General, ret.: head dept. ZAIG/evaluation and information); Alfred Kleine (General, ret.: head main-dept. XVIII/economical security); Horst Maennchen (General, ret.: head main-dept. III/signals intelligence); Guenter Moeller (General, ret.: head main-dept. KS/personnel division); Gerhard Neiber (General, ret.: Deputy Secretary of State Security); Willi Opitz (General, ret.: head JHP/MfS-academy); Siegfried Rataizik (Colonel, ret.: head dept. XIV/imprisonment on remand); Wolfgang Schmidt (Ltnt.-Col., ret.: head information div. of main-dept.XX/ internal and state security); Wolfgang Schwanitz (General, ret.: Deputy Secretary of State Security); Dieter Skiba (Colonel, ret.: head dept. IX-11/internal NS-archive); Wolfgang Stuchly (Ltnt.-Col., ret.: head dept. II-5/counter-espionage investigations).
Looking at the variety of organisational units covered by the group of authors it becomes obvious that the book concentrates on subjects of internal national security and intelligence. This was what they had intended because there is a multitude of publications concerning the GDR’s external intelligence service, the Hauptverwaltung A (HV A, main-administration A, foreign espionage) already available since many years. Therefore „Die Sicherheit" deals with counter-intelligence work and national state-security duties for which the MfS had been responsible since its constitution on February 8, 1950.

Their Essays
Volume 1 begins with the chapter "The End" ("Das Ende"). It reminds of the political situation of 1989/90. The authors explain the influence the policy of persistency of the ruling party SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Socialist Unity Party of Germany) had on the MfS during these decisive months. The SED was unable to deal with the seething situation in her country. For the MfS the party’s silence, the sudden lack of governance was paralysing: since four decades the MfS had acted strictly by order of the SED. Now there were no directions anymore while the political and social order changed. But without SED-direction there was no MfS-action. This, too, had been the maxim of the MfS over forty years.
This supremacy of the SED and its security-policy regarding national, international and military affairs is subject of the second essay. Written by Grimmer, Irmler, Neiber, and Schwanitz here the socialistic understanding of state, society and party-interests becomes evident. Though they were rated as different subjects they were considered to be elements of a homogeneous oneness. Like in all other nations ruled by communist/ socialist governments, party interests dominated state-affairs in the GDR, too. Although the authors do not express such views explicitly reading between the lines it becomes obvious that the continuous weakness of such a system was that the ruling party only relied on a multitude but never had any majority.
So such governments constantly have to consolidate and secure their power. E. g., the constitution of the GDR cemented the dominating position of the SED within East-Germany’s state, government, and society.
One of the party’s instruments to secure its absolute power was the MfS. This function of the ministry was destined in its statutes of 1953 and 1969. Both are reproduced at the end of this chapter. The authors equate these statutes with regular, legislative laws. But this is unjustified for both statutes had been classified top secret and before they were published after 1990 they had been known to a very limited group of officials only. The authors are aware of this fact but apparently neglect it which curtails their essay’s quality.
The value of this chapter is that the security policy of the SED is explained as integrated into the contemporary context of German and Cold War history. Problems of realizing sovereign policy are presented as well as the consequences resulting from this political situation for the MfS. Acting on behalf and by order of the leadership of the SED the MfS had to deal with almost everything the party perceived as potentially hostile or dangerous. To a certain degree such an employment of a state security authority is justified which the authors substantiate. But they express clear criticism about the SED for making the ministry increasingly responsible for handling all kinds of political and social problems.
At the end of this comprehensive essay it has become evident that the MfS had not been an imperium arcanum within the GDR but was an instrument of the SED government acting by order of the party. Its actions had not been without legal positions but were in accordance with GDR jurisdiction.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are about duties and methods employed by the MfS. Grimmer and Irmler explain the variety of hostile activities the MfS had to deal with. They included all kinds of criminals, foreign intelligence services and organizations whose activities had been aimed at destabilizing the GDR but also individuals and groups who tried to establish alterations of the SED-policy.
Here, too, the problem is explained that the SED increasingly used its MfS to solve social problems. The more political and social problems and difficulties appeared the more the SED shifted its responsibility to the MfS until the ministry even had to control the performance of planned economy targets. Clearly the authors criticize that the MfS was alienated from its actual purposes by the party (vol. 1, p. 269). In their retrospective view they conclude that "these were unfit attempts to influence or even control social proceedings" (vol. 1, p. 266).
But although the MfS had to deal with increasingly more duties it is incorrect to describe East Germany’s state security system as ubiquitously. A value of this chapter is that Grimmer and Irmler state many facts and figures against this widespread prejudice. Their arguments will support further serious research.
Among the methods the MfS had applied to investigate potentially hostile activities were its so-called Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IM, Unofficial Employees). These IM were what other intelligence services refer to as sources, informers, assets etc., they were elements of the MfS’ human intelligence. Comprehensively Anders and Opitz explain the multitude of administrative rules MfS officers had to apply when recruiting and employing IM. And they describe the various categories of IM which is not new but interesting to everyone with interest in this subject and because it is important to know such differences for a factual dealing with this subject.
No one would deny any intelligence or security authority to employ HumInt like IM. The decisive question is up to which degree is it legitimate to apply this instrument. Unfortunately the authors did not touch this subject. On the other hand it is an advantage of their chapter that they explain the employment of IM among juveniles to counter falsified information spread in various publications. And they express their regret that case-officers and leading cadres of the MfS had been unable to protect their IM since 1990.
The IM-chapter is followed by an essay by Coburger and Rauscher about covert investigation and observation. Written in a very factual way they explain the various methods and techniques the main-department VIII and its sub-units had employed; Coburger had been head of this main-department until 1989.
They inform about the requirements the staff of this unit had to meet and about the variety of duties. Among them were observations of dead-letter-boxes, transit-routes through GDR-territory, suspects of counter-espionage investigations and the Military Liaison Missions of the Western allied forces which had been stationed in Potsdam. Allied legal positions allowed them to inspect military activities in GDR territory. VIII-units were constantly on their track. Main-dept. VIII also carried out secret investigations in the West but unfortunately the authors refuse to reveal more than that fact itself.
There have been some superficial reports about supposedly ultra-secret MfS-officers. Coburger and Rauscher explain this special category of officers, referred to as U-Mitarbeiter (U-employees). They were merely used to carry out investigations in environments where their affiliation with the MfS had to be kept secret in any case.
Opitz introduces the chapters 7 to 17. His report imparts a brief survey about the organisational responsibilities of various main-departments and departments of the MfS. Some of these units are described in detail in the following chapters beginning with main-dept. II/ counter-espionage.
Between 1954 and 1982 Moeller had served in the MfS’ counter-espionage before his transfer to the personnel division. Stuchly, too, had spent most of his career in counter-espionage. Their comprehensive and factual report reveals many details of espionage cases targeted against the GDR. They begin with an informative tour d´horizon of Western intelligence services which were responsible for most of the espionage activities against East Germany: West Germany’s BND, Verfassungsschutz, the US intelligence community and the services of Great Britain and France. Having introduced these adversaries the authors show methods and techniques used by the MfS to counter their activities (in co-operation with the Soviet KGB and other partner services).
Having described the organisational history of the units of (main-) dept. II, Moeller and Stuchly explain some techniques employed by the MfS to investigate espionage cases. The MfS concentrated on prevention and detecting the lines of communications of foreign agents. The authors’ description of these MfS’ efforts and techniques is remarkable e. g., their explanation of detecting secret inks, secret copy-paper etc. as well as carefully observing physical movements of suspected agents and couriers.
Though they explain many cases of Western espionage in and against the GDR and reveal some cases of amazing carelessness of these agencies the authors pay respect to their former opponents in a certain way. They do not name agents and case officers of these intelligence services and they also do not reveal too many details regarding their offices – though there is no doubt that their profound knowledge would have allowed them to do so.
The units of main-dept. III were the NSA/CSS of the GDR responsible for signals intelligence as well as communication security. Main-dept. III had been build up by Horst Maennchen. Therefore, one would expect a lot of his essay – but one should not. There are only 16 pages of text and this description of the MfS’ SigInt and ComSec capabilities is not appropriate to the competence of Maennchen and Schwanitz who wrote this chapter.
Their explanation of SigInt is as general as of techniques to locate agents using radio communication. But with interest readers will note the authors’ statement that the GDR’s official lines of telecommunication "were open like gates of a shed" to Western signals intelligence gathering (vol. 1, p. 575). And they admit that the MfS had been unable to convince those authorities responsible to improve this situation. The second valuable information of this chapter are the explanations and illustrations of seismic and magnetic sensors employed by Western intelligence services to detect movements around military installations in the GDR.
Internal state security is the final chapter of volume one and of quite difficult and controverse contents. In accordance with the understanding of the political supremacy of the SED stated above the range of political activities considered as potentially dangerous was wide and affected many citizens. Furthermore even those who considered themselves as loyal to the system could easily become suspects of illoyality just because they criticized the SED’s political and social system merely with the intention to improve it.
Besides these political opponents and those who assisted Western efforts to destabilize the GDR society the XX was responsible for the surveillance of religious organizations, the areas of culture, science, and education.
There have been many media reports regarding the MfS’ interest in juveniles. Schmidt spends a lot of attention to this subject and accounts for these measures in detail. One may not agree with such practices but Schmidt’s explanations truly deserve to be taken into consideration.
Of course, there have been many Western organizations, groups, and individuals whose efforts had been aimed at stirring up dissatisfaction among GDR citizens and to destabilize her political system. Many of these are comprehensively described as well as the necessity for the MfS to counter such activities. Some of these persons and groups did not even hesitate to apply violence as Schmidt states correctly. But sometimes violence had been part of MfS counter-measures, too. It would have supported the veracity of Schmidt’s essay if he had not concealed such operations.
With Schmidt again another author states that and how the SED had made use of its authority for state security to solve social problems, and Schmidt, too, criticizes this fact. It characterizes the deafness of the SED leadership when it constantly ignored proposals for solutions by the MfS (vol. 1, p. 655).
The chapter on the units of the organisational line XVIII was written by Haehnel und Kleine, the later having served as head of this main-dept. since 1974. The XVIII had been responsible for the protection of the people’s economy. Sabotage and espionage had to be prevented and investigated. The authors describe many such cases, even more than enough to substantiate the fact that the GDR’s economy had been a target of foreign espionage agents partially aimed at causing disturbances and damages.
Factually the authors connect the development of this unit with the development of the political and economical situation of East Germany. Here, too, it becomes obvious that and how the MfS had to serve SED interests. And it becomes evident once again that the ruling party quite often ignored MfS-reports on economical problems that would have required political solutions instead of state security service measures. E. g. Haehnel and Kleine state that in the 1980s main-dept. XVIII had prepared "more than 500 information for the leadership of party and state referring to the real situation of the people’s economy" (vol. 2, p. 149). But the SED did not react and preferred to continue her "problem-ignoring propaganda" (vol. 2, p. 151).
It is unfortunate that the chapter does not contain more information as to dept. 7 of main-dept. XVIII. This unit had been tasked with HumInt operations in the West thus doing there what other XVIII-units tried to prevent at home. But here, the authors prefer to remain discreet.
ZKG/BKG were units without equivalent in Western intelligence and security services. Die Zentrale Koordinierungsgruppe (ZKG, Central Co-ordination Group) of the ministry and the Bezirkskoordinierungsgruppen (BKG, District Co-ordination Groups) were established in 1975, not accidentally the year of the CSCE closing in Helsinki. ZKG/BKG were ordered to co-ordinate all efforts of the various MfS-units and -branches to repress the constantly increasing number of applications and legal claims for exit permits as well as all other legal and illegal attempts to leave the GDR.
Niebling, who had served as ZKG-head since 1983, describes the various methods used by East German citizens to leave their country – either in accordance with GDR law or violating it. He quotes an MfS-report stating that between 1961 and September 1989 there had been 556,541 cases of legal applications for permanent exit while there were 94,649 "illegal border crossings" within this period if time (vol. 2, pp. 206, 207). Unfortunately, it is not said how many attempts of such border crossings had failed and what had happened to these persons.
Niebling’s essay shows the difference between law and justice. Though he comprehensively explains the legal basis of various MfS-measures there is no word as to their legitimacy, there is no attempt to find answers as to why so many citizens wanted to leave the GDR. All the author states to this is that "it is incontestable that ... the reasons to deny permanent exit permits were relatively extensive, the reasons for granting such permits were very strict on the other hand" (vol. 2, p. 213).
Once more one realizes that the SED used its secret service to solve social problems in secrecy instead of developing appropriate political solutions. Niebling clearly states that the SED’s "commanded concealment" and "glossing over" caused increasing discontent (vol. 2, p. 182). But MfS information to the Politburo and Central Committee did not result in any changes of this policy. It is a valuable detail of his essay that Niebling explains how this policy was expressed in lacks within jurisdiction. According to Niebling the main tasks of the MfS and the GDR Home Office (it had also been involved here) had not been to apply restrictive measures but to induce those who wanted to leave to stay and "to integrate them into the GDR-society again" (vol. 2, p. 217).
The "prevention of terror and other acts of violence. (HA XXII in MfS)" is the headline of the chapter by Neiber and Plomann. They begin with explaining definitions of terrorism and its theoretical background. This is quite valuable especially in times of considerable public attention in and concern about this phenomenon, and the authors even include the events of Sept. 11, 2001, as well as the military operations against Afghanistan.
But there is no necessity for that especially because although their essay consists of 103 pages not much is said about the way the MfS’ main-dept. XXII worked, which methods were employed nor what the MfS had really known about certain terrorist groups and their activities. It is also unfortunate that is seems as if the MfS or at least these authors did not distinguish between acts of terrorism and sabotage.
Though MfS counter-terrorism had involved operations abroad the reader only learns that such "operative measures in the Operationsgebiet [area of operation, MfS-term for the West] were co-ordinated in compliance with the secrecy" (vol. 2, p. 302). Would you like to be told more about these "operative measures"? Me, too. Instead of writing comprehensively about West-Germany’s practise of countering terrorism it would have supported the books concern much more if the authors had written more about the practise of their MfS.
The same with ‘Carlos’: there are only two and a half pages about this famous terrorist group which had stayed in East-Berlin for some time. The authors reveal nothing not already known from other sources such as the books by Wilhelm Dietl (which they quote) or David Yallop.
Truly interesting on the other hand is the description of MfS-Operation ‘Bus’. As a consequence of the attempt on the discotheque ‘La Belle’ in West-Berlin in 1986 (the authors say almost nothing about its circumstances or background) dept. XXII arranged measures to protect busses used by US military personnel: only in 1987 approx. 36,000 civilian and 37,000 military staff of the US forces used them to visit East-Berlin. There had been information of planned terrorist attacks against these busses and the US ambassador had asked the GDR government to increase protective measures. MfS-dept. XXII was responsible and its forces escorted these busses from the moment they entered East-Berlin until they left East-Germany’s capital.
The MfS-equivalent of the KGB’s 3rd main-directorate was the main-dept. I (military counter-espionage). Since 1971 Dietze had served as deputy to main-dept. chief Karl Kleinjung before succeeding him in 1981. He and Riebe factually explain the special organization of this unit which had been arranged parallel to the structure of the GDR’s armed forces Nationale Volksarmee (NVA, National People’s Army) and the Grenztruppen (GT, Border Troops).
The first responsibility of main-dept. I was to protect NVA and GT against foreign espionage as well as hostile and dangerous activities. Though the authors describe a few cases they hold back some of the units remarkable failures such as agent Martha. She had been the housekeeper of KGB-general Pitovrannev and then of general Karl Linke the first chief of the NVA’s military intelligence department until 1957. Only a year later the I had not been able to prevent the desertion of Siegfried Dombrowski, a high-ranking military intelligence officer. And Dietze/ Riebe also don’t mention the operation against the NVA’s MI-head Gregori in the 1970s/ 1980s though Dietze had been decisively involved.
The second responsibility of main-dept. I was to conduct reconnaissance operations in the West. Here, the unit concentrated on military and police activities on West-German territory. This included duties of the Grenzaufklärung (Border Reconnaissance) along the GDR’s border to West-Germany up to 50 km deep into the West (since 1982 reduced to 30 km). The authors also reveal some details regarding main-dept. I’s dept. Aeussere Abwehr (External Counter-service). Dept. AA had several special duties and forces. They were involved in the death of Michael Gartenschlaeger in 1976 when he had tried to steal a SM-70 mine from the border fence. Furthermore, AA forces tried to get GDR military officers who had deserted to the West to return.
The MfS had also been tasked with certain criminal investigation duties. This was the field of main-dept. IX and its dept. IX in the district offices. The essay by Coburger and Skiba explains this field of MfS-activity. It concentrates strongly on laws and legal positions. Comprehensively they state the multitude of laws, directions, orders etc. which had to be applied when conducting such investigations. Since to most readers this legal framework is relatively unknown their explanations are rather valuable. But unfortunately the authors leave it at that and do almost not explain investigative practise. Also, there are no explanations regarding death penalties and executions (the last had been 1981).
Of much interest is their description of dept. IX/11. This was the MfS’ archive for documents relating to the period of National socialism. Established in 1967 it consisted of approx. 11 km of written material and had entries to more than 2 million persons. Skiba was officer of IX/11 and served as its last head. The essay about this unit and its records describes an interesting and vulnerable chapter of German history, the different attitudes of the East- and the West-German state towards NS-history.
The MfS had maintained jails for prisoners on remand under the control of its dept. XIV. The author of this chapter, Rataizik, had served in dept. XIV since 1951 and as its head from 1963 to 1990. He spent a lot of efforts to put in order the many irritating and false information circulating about these prisons for a long time.
Of course, conditions of detention as Rataizik sees it, differ from experiences and recollections of former prisoners. But factually he describes the organization of custody and explains why there had been devices such as X-ray instruments and refutes further rumours. It is right that he criticizes memorial and other institutions for the pursue of not objective research. And it is remarkable that Rataizik refers to criminal investigations and judgements of various courts pronounced since the German reunification.
The last unit described is the Juristische Hochschule Potsdam (JHP). It was the academy of the MfS headed by Opitz until 1985. It is interesting to read how integrated the JHP had been within the educational system of the GDR. Opitz explains the various subjects and curricula thought and applied at the JHP. Comprehensively he describes the diversity of chairs which thought general education subjects as well as historical, political, criminal investigation and legal, and, of course, specific intelligence related subjects likewise.
Beyond his JHP-explanation Opitz informs about the school of the West-German internal security services. Since not much has been published about this institution so far his description is a valuable extra.
The final chapter, written by Opitz, too, is a critical essay about the BStU which is the abbreviation for the Bundesbeauftragte fuer die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic). The government office with this impressive name is the custodian of the MfS’s estate since 1990/91.
Opitz criticizes the way the BStU handles the release of MfS’ material and that the authority does not distinguish the different records correctly. He further refers to the problem that numbers of entries in MfS card-indexes are presented often as exceptional though they should be related to the number of entries of other intelligence and security services.

General Remarks
This publication will cause a lot of criticism. Less because of its contents but because of its authors. Especially in Germany there are still many and influential people who are convinced that what they like to refer to as "former perpetrators" should not be allowed to obtain such public attention. In accordance with the evaluation of the previous perception of similar publications and public statements these circles will spend a lot of efforts to discriminate this book.
But "Die Sicherheit" deserves the unbiased attention of all who take a serious and unprejudiced interest in East Germany’s system and ministry of state security and intelligence as well as of all those who want to get to know as many different approaches and views as possible.
The book does not contain a vast quantity of facts unknown so far. It is rather the comprehensive presentation of views and facts by almost twenty high-ranking officers with the intention to document. Certainly, there will be criticism that the authors have documented and recounted only: they did not achieve to analyse what they have documented so comprehensively. But such remonstrances are unjustified. Analysing may follow documentation – but this is not imperative. It is absolutely acceptable to deliver a profound documentation only.
On no account they wanted to deliver a justification or apology in the meaning of mea culpa maxima culpa. But the authors do not hesitate to criticize: they express self-criticism as well as criticism on their former actions, the lack of appropriate command by the leadership of the SED and especially the BStU. Their remarks should be taken into consideration further on.
There are some weaknesses which ought to be noted. Many people will find it difficult to accept the very bureaucratic and impersonal language of almost all essays. This supports the authors’ intention to deliver factual reports but it will disturb many who associate the subject with personal interests on the other hand.
The essays appear to have been written individually; there is no systematic manner perceptible according to that the essays have been written. While some authors quote a lot of sources used others don’t. It is valuable that a lot of the material used to support statements is not of GDR origin. Almost all author used material by West-German, sometimes even US-sources. This way they prevent arguments to have relied on GDR-literature only.
But the book lacks another systematic manner, too. It seems as if the authors have not sufficiently studied the current state of historiographical research as to their subjects. For example, there are explanations regarding the case of Noel Field. But among the sources quoted the profound results of Bernd-Rainer Barth or Wilfriede Otto have not been taken into consideration in a recognizable way at least. And although results of historian Gerhard Keiderling are quoted he often is stated as "Keiderlin". The same with Siegfried Suckut who is quoted as "Suckot". Unfortunately such negligences in details run through the volumes though they clearly were avoidable.
The book is arranged in an ingenious order. It begins with introductions to the contemporary context followed by explanations of general methods applied by various units of the MfS. They are described in the following chapters. But the reader is not informed why certain units have not been included in the book though one expects their description. Among these units is the main-dept. XIX for securing all areas of public transport including Deutrans and Interflug (though former head of XIX, Edgar Braun, is among the authors), the main-dept. for person-protection (the MfS had a quite esteemed bodyguard unit), the bureau for legal affairs, dept. 26 for technical surveillance (the ‘bug boys’ of the MfS) and others.
Almost all essays lack explicit statements of the authors’ understanding of their points of view. They have been in very high positions for a long time so their world had consisted of instructing and commanding, of general instructions and orders. This precondition has strongly influenced the points of view of their essays. The basis of their arguments are such general instructions, laws etc. – thus the way things should have been according to these formal rules. Of course, there have been differences between the way it should have been and the way it really was. The authors should have stated that they are aware of this fact.
The absolute deficit of "Die Sicherheit" is that it does not contain a profound index. It is a great slovenliness to publish a historical book of more than twelvehundred pages and then to leave it up to its reader to find again certain facts, names or places. But this is to the fault of the authors but the most unfortunate understanding of ‘service’ to the customer of the publishing company.
It is valuable that all essays are endeavoured to brake with the widespread point of view to look at the GDR, its armed forces, and especially its ministry of state security as a singular phenomenon. They explain the necessity to look at the GDR in the context of history and especially the Cold War. The historical and political interdependencies, reciprocities and mutualities had an immediate influence and consequences on the development and policy of the MfS. This understanding needs to be accepted.
Further, the MfS is one of the best investigated intelligence and security organizations. But the profound knowledge must not allow the misleading attitude to estimate the MfS as a singularity. All facts available will remain to be quite one-sided as long as archives of similar institutions remain closed.
The overall conclusive result of "Die Sicherheit" is that intelligence and security services are appropriate instruments to detect, observe and investigate political and social dangers and threats. But they are not appropriate instruments to solve such problems. This was true until 1990 – it still is in 2002.

Bodo Wegmann, Berlin

Vitaly Grigoryevitch Pavlov, retired Lieutenant General of the KGB, is a veteran of Soviet intelligence. In the employ of the secret service since 1938, he was its resident in Canada from 1942 to 1946 and in Austria from 1966 to 1970. In the time between, he was the first deputy of the chief of foreign espionage of the KGB from 1961 to 1966. From 1971 to 1973 he headed the training institute of the KGB. In 1973 Andropov, then the head of the KGB, appointed him chief of the liaison mission of the KGB in Poland, an he served in this capacity until 1984, in years that were full of tensions in Poland. During that time he observed the activities of the the leaderships of party and state in Poland as well as those of the Catholic clergy and of the representatives of the political opposition. Pavlov cooperated closely with the Polish Ministers of the Interior Kowalczyk, Milewski and Kiszak. His book chiefly contains biographical notes and personal remembrances of the leading personalities in Poland in that period of upheaval.
Pavlov is generally well informed of the palace intrigues and jealousies among the Polish political establishment and of the activities of the opposition, though he claims to have always respected the principle of not employing undercover means in a friendly country. His informers, chiefly from party circles and the Ministry of the Interior, are said to have supplied him from pure ideological motives.
He pays special attention in his memoirs to Wojciech Jaruzelski. He is regarded as an outstanding Polish statesman, but also as an accomplished actor and a psychological enigma, as not so particular in telling the truth, e.g. in his interview by Spiegel in May 1992. Pavlov asserts that contrary to Jaruzelski´s remarks a Soviet invasion of Poland was not intended at any time. In a statement conveyed to party chief Kania and prime minister Jaruzelski in August 1981 Andropov had clearly declined such a measure. According to Pavlov, the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981 was an independent decision of the Polish leadership !
Pavlov describes Edward Gierek as a complacent politician in poor contact with the people, and has nothing but scorn for Gierek´s ideas of a „Polish atom bomb" or of aquiring part of Antarctica for Poland. Pavlov regards Stanislaw Kania as a weak politician without authority and vision. He has a surprisingly positive opinion of Tadeusz Grabski.
Pavlov is reticent about his own share in the development of events in Poland. For instance, he confirmed after the IXth Party Congress of the Polish Workers´ Party in July 1981 the worst fears of KGB chief Andropov when he announced that Kania had lost all support of the party and the people and that the collapse of the socialist system in Poland was imminent. Pavlov strongly pleaded for a change in Polish leadership, though in in his book he ascribes to himself only the role of a neutral observer in a friendly country.
Pavlov comments critically on the information relayed by the Soviet diplomats in Poland. As his information about a brewing crisis in Poland were in a diametrical contrast to the opinions given by the Soviet ambassador S.A Pilatovitch, Pavlov was about to be recalled in disgrace. The outbreak of the crisis in 1976 „saved" him, and now Pilatovitch was recalled. With his reports Pavlov had won the unqualified confidence of Andropov, with whom he afterwards was in contact by phone almost every day. As a reward for his intelligence services Pavlov was made a Lieutenant General of the KGB out of turn. He accords an exaggerated importance for the outbreak and the course of the crisis in Poland to the case of the Polish spy Kuklinski, a colonel in the General Staff who worked for CIA.
Pavlov`s memoir bear the stamp of the former secret service man. His book is a contribution to the picture of the events of the years from 1973 to 1984 as they were received and evaluated in the circles of the Soviet leadership and intelligence service.

Jürgen Schmidt, Oranienburg

Jürgen Schmidt, Oranienburg
transl.by Anja Becker