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Summer 2004
At the end of World War II, the U.S. ArmyÆs
Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) aided the U.S. Military Government in a less
than successful effort to denazify Germany. Using as a case example the
denazification of the Heidelberg University faculty, several reasons for the
CICÆs limited ability to conduct completely its mission successfully can be
distinguished: the Military Government pragmatically focused on immediately
reviving Germany at the expense of a thorough investigation of the past, made
contradictory changes in the application of denazification policy, and proved
unable to prevent CIC agents quarreling with officers from other Military
Government elements concerning the proper implementation of denazification. Most
significant, however, the Military Government found it impossible to devise an
adequate definition of a Nazi, especially one that encompassed those individuals
who had never joined the party but were unsuited to creating an institution free
from the taint of the Nazi past. As a result, the CIC was unable to purge
completely the faculty of Heidelberg University of those individuals who had
compromised themselves during the Third Reich. This study reveals some of the
generally overlooked field level limitations on American post-World War II
efforts to transform Germany. |
The Journal of Intelligence History is published by the International
Intelligence History Study Group, founded in 1993 to promote scholarly
research on intelligence organizations and their impact on historical development
and international relations.