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Summer 2004
The early post-World War II operations of the principal
American clandestine services, the Office of Strategic Services and its
successor, the Strategic Services Unit, were seriously compromised by
insufficient staff, bureaucratic bickering in Washington over the shape and
scope of postwar intelligence programs, inadequate guidance and direction from
headquarters, and the need, particularly in Germany, Austria and Eastern Europe,
to create from little or nothing a clandestine intelligence apparatus. The
result was a cautious and rather lackluster approach to intelligence collection
that often produced information of purely local or ephemeral interest. Only in
early 1946, when the Soviet Union emerged as the primary target, did American
clandestine intelligence in Europe begin to reacquire the resources, focus and
energy necessary to serve the needs of American policy makers. |
The Journal of Intelligence History is published by the International
Intelligence History Study Group, founded in 1993 to promote scholarly
research on intelligence organizations and their impact on historical development
and international relations.