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Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism:
A Clausewitzian-Historical Analysis
by BRIAN R. SULLIVAN

Abstract

Clausewitz appears to disparage intelligence in On War, describing it as likely to be false, contradictory or too uncertain as the basis on which to act. Yet in the war on terror, experts agree good intelligence is essential to prevent terrorist acts or find those responsible after the fact. Is Clausewitz wrong or are terrorist crimes and the struggle to prevent them not really war? A historical analysis of terrorism and counter terrorism supports the idea that they are the offensive and defensive sides of armed conflict for political ends, Clausewitz' definition of war. A closer examination of On War indicates Clausewitz' seeming rejection of the value of intelligence applies only on the tactical level. When he wrote, the speedy and accurate transmission of information was rare, making battlefield use problematic. Technological developments in the two centuries since Clausewitz' experience with war have largely - although not completely - eliminated such communications defects. Nonetheless, the effective application of intelligence still depends not so much on technological as on human factors, especially interagency cooperation, good leadership and political resolve.